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"MEDICAL DEMOCRACY IN A HEALTH SYSTEMS
AGENCY: THE ROLE OF STAFF"
James Latimore
University of North Carolina at Charlotte

ABSTRACT
The performance of consumers or laypersons in government programs has
been studied extensively, usually from the standpoint of the control exercised by providers or other professionals, or correlatively, what consumers
need in order to be on an equal footing with the experts. At stake is lay
control -i.e.,
democracy. This case study of one Health Systems Agency (HSA)
in contrast, focuses attention on the crucial role of the HSA staff in the
democratization of health care.
Outcomes, such as cost-containment and allocation of resources, can be examined in terms of the staff's interests and
the constraints of its multi-leveled environment. From this perspective, the
recruitment, selection, socialization, promotion, training and control of consumers are seen as important factors in the decisions made by the HSA, and
these factors are seen as being greatly influenced by staff members as they
seek to achieve a balance of outcomes. The balance of outcomes may include
certain material and professional interests of the staff itself.
In this process, lay control becomes subordinated.

After a short life, Health Systems Agencies (HSAs) are apparently doomed.
The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (P.L. 93641) mandated consumer majorities on the governing bodies and the substantive
committees of Health Systems Agencies to carry out the purposes of the Act:
viz., to improve the health of residents of the health service area, to increase
the accessibility and quality of services and to restrain increases in health
care costs, partly by preventing unnecessary duplication of health resources.
Consumers are to be broadly representative of the health services area in terms
of its geographical, social, economic, and ethnic characteristics.
The 1979 amendments to the Act broadened the definition of consumer to
include, for example, those who served on hospital boards of trustees, formerly
classified as "indirect providers" of health care. Even with this change, however, consumers have been expected to bring a lay perspective to deliberations
involving local health planning and, armed with their certificate-of-need power
and aided by a staff of professional health planners, to bring the escalation
of costs under control.
The Reagan administration has announced plans to rapidly phase out the
HSAs as part of its overall reduction of federal programs.
Scholarly analysis
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of the HSA program had hardly begun. With certain exceptions, little is known
about the accomplishments and problems of the HSAs, and there will apparently
be no opportunity to modify the program based on the accumulation of empirical
data.
It might seem pointless to attempt an analysis of the program on its
deathbed, so to speak. However, for those interested in the problem of democratic control over social institutions, such an analysis is quite worthwhile.
The cornerstone of the HSA was (and still is, in its final hours) the consumer
majority on its decision-making bodies, a majority which could prevail over
the combined interests of health-care providers: physicians, hospital administrators, Blue Cross and other insurers, etc.
This paper is based on a study of an HSA in which the author has served
as a member of the Project Review Committee (PRC) for three years. This committee's primary task is to review applications from hospitals for new construction and for the purchase of equipment costing in excess of $150,000, and
to make a recommendation to the HSAs Governing Body. The Governing Body-also
with a consumer majority-then reviews the application and submits ite recommendation to the appropriate body at the state level. Although the PRC receives
reports and advisory recommendations from Sub-area Councils (SACs), it is the
first unit to hold public hearings on the matter and where a vote is required.
Since higher units seldom contravene its decisions, the PRC occupies a central
position in the decision-making process.
Limiting the study to one HSA is unfortunate in many respects (even if
unavoidable here).
In some ways, the mid-state HSA (as it is called here) is
quite "typical" when compared with other HSAs described in the evaluation
literature: the high proportion of projects approved; a tendency to give priority to increased access to and quality of health care over cost-containment;
the under representation of low-income consumers, etc. With respect to these
findings see, for example, the findings of Salkever and Bice (1976) and the
research conducted by Lewin and Associates, Inc. (1975). Of course, it would
be far better to have more comparisons, even on a regional basis. However,
given the paucity of HSA studies (as opposed to evaluations), perhaps the
present one has at least something to offer. Moreover, it is always to be
hoped, in studies of this kind, that certain gains in understanding partially
offset the losses in comparability and generalization. It can even be argued
that knowing what is typical and general is, in principle, no more instructive
(or useful) than knowing what can happen under certain conditions.
Literature
The literature on the problem of consumer participation (versus control)
is fairly extensive, much of it based on earlier programs such as the Model
Cities and the Comprehensive Health Planning (CHP) programs. The effectiveness
of consumer participation in decision-making has been shown to vary with a
number of factors. Moguloff (1969) for example, has pointed to "previous
participatory experience" as one factor that influences the consumer's effectiveness. Daniels (1973) has proposed that consumers without an identifiable
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constituency are unlikely to be effective. Graves (1970) relates effectivenes
to the consumer's access to resources that balance the power and influence of
health-care providers. The importance of clarifying program goals is stressed
by Partridge (1973); failure in this task was found to be associated with a
concentration on procedural rather than substantive tasks, and with consumers
dropping out because of a lack of impact on the program. Parker (1970) has
focused on the need for training consumers in planning skills and providing
them with substantive knowledge.
Most of the literature either states explicitly or implies that failure
to deal with the problems discussed above leaves the consumer open to domination by the better organized and more powerful providers such as physicians
and hospital administrators. Douglass (1973) found that providers were more
influential than consumers in the planning of Model Cities health programs.
Salber (1970) found that physician-providers often find it difficult to view
(and accept) the consumer as citizen rather than as a patient, and that sharing decision-making with consumers runs counter to the content of professional
education. Metsch and Veney (1980) also observe that "provider attitudes
toward consumer participation are a critical determinant of the impact of
consumer participation on the delivery of health care services."
Metsch and Veney (1980) argue that government legislation has reduced
consumer demand on the health care system by creating participatory structures
such as HSAs, but has not re-allocated the resources which the consumer sector
needs in order to be effective within the structures. Until this occurs, the
outlook is for incremental rather than fundamental changes. Marmor and Morone
(1980) are equally critical of the failure of the legislation to address and
resolve certain crucial problems:
"Logic rebels at the peculiar idea that a planning agency
without sufficient authority can scheme, scold and cajole
a dynamic system into compliance with plans that run contrary to all that system's incentives."
Not only do HSAs lack the necessary authority and resources, but the legislation has not dealt with the problems of whom the consumers should represent,
how they should be chosen so as to be representative, and providing adequate
structures of accountability.
The problem of interest here is not the lack of authority of HSAs. Rather,
it is: what do they do with the authority they have? Lack of authority can
always be cited all the way up to a centrally-planned state (where different
problems become salient). Within the context of available authority and the
use of it, the interest is centered on the HSA staff as the recruiter of consumers and as a counterweight to the expertise of providers. The staff is,
if not an adversary of providers, at least presumptively committed to the goals
embodied in the legislation and is at the service of consumers as the majority.
The staff of the HSA (and similar programs) may be the key to the success of
democratic processes in sectors dominated by strong professions and high technology. This can only be suggested here, though it is seemingly supported by
the literature previously discussed.
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The PRC at Work
Three dimensions of the PRC's activity were of interest and some attempt
was made to gauge them: (1) effectiveness in cost containment; (2) dependence
of consumers on the staff; and (3) the degree of unanimity on the committee.
The dollar value of the proposals presented to the PRC in a recent oneyear period was used to assess the cost-control effectiveness of the staffrecruited committee (with its consumer majority). The value of the approvals
was nearly $30 million and the value of the disapprovals only about $2.8 million-a 91% approved-dollar rate (or a 9% rejection rate). The number of
proposals approved was 28 (out of 31 submitted).
The dependence of committee members on staff analyses and recommendations
can be suggested by looking at the decisions made by the Project Review Committee over a one-year period. Of the 31 proposals presented to the committee
for a decision, the committee adhered to the staff's recommendation on 30 of
the proposals. Furthermore, the committee's vote was unanimous on 26 of the
proposals. There were no more than two negative votes (either opposed or
abstaining) on the five remaining proposals.
Some understanding of this conformity to staff recommendations can be
gained from looking at the process of committee meetings. Consumers on the
Project Review Committee are required to make decisions about matters involving high technical knowledge and tend to be more dependent on staff than providers are. At one meeting of this committee, the kind of remarks made by
consumers and providers were classified and counted. Remarks were classified
according to whether they represented positive statements about the proposal,
clarifying questions about the finer points of a proposal, or "educational"
questions reflecting rather clearly ignorance of the purpose of the equipment
sought or some other matter. Consumers asked three "educational questions"
and providers asked none. Consumers made two "statements" and providers made
nine.
These results, especially those regarding the unanimity of votes and the
high approval rate on proposals, are somewhat paradoxical when seen in the
context of consumer attitudes toward providers. Farris (1980) surveyed the
consumer members of Mid-State HSA's Project Review Committee. Although the
sample was small and the response rate rather low (about 50%), some information is available on this topic. Consumer members of the PRC were asked if
health costs in general were too high; then which specific kinds of costs
(such as doctors' fees, hospital room rates and medicine) were too high;
finally, why those costs were too high, in their opinion. Only one respondent
believed that health costs in general were not too high, and even that one
said that they were too high but that she understood the reason for it. The
respondents als -elieved that all the specific costs listed were too high,
although there was some variation among these.. Three (of eight) respondents,
for example, said that doctors' fees were not too high, while only one (of
six) said that the cost of hospital emergency-room services was not too high.
Half the respondents (four) attributed the problem of high costs to provider
greed: "greedy doctors" and/or companies, profiteering, overcharging, etc.
Another two identified poor hospital management as the culprit.
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This sounds like a situation in which a low rate of unanimity would be
expected. However, there were, evidently, cross-currents at work. The same
consumers surveyed by Farris also tended to identify providers as being most
influential for them in making decisions. When asked whose opinions and ideas
carried the most weight for them in decision-making, the majority (4 of 7)
mentioned providers only or specific providers along with specific other consumers. Only two identified other consumers exclusively. The expertise and
experiences of providers was often cited as a reason for their influence. This
can be more fully appreciated by looking at some of the forces at work on the
consumer.
Ambushing the Consumer
To be a consumer on the PRC means having to cope with at least four potent
forces, all tending to predetermine decision. These can be called (1) the technology bind; (2) the me-too principle; (3) medical revivalism; and (4) the levitation factor.
The "technology bind" comes into play when a hospital proposes to replace
an existing piece of equipment such as a computer, an x-ray machine or a laboratory analyzer. Usually, the equipment is still working but is technologically
obsolete. That is, the manufacturer has a better machine available that he must
sell. The best sales tool, apparently, is to reduce or withdraw maintenance
and repair services on the older equipment. The hospital is thus the first to
feel the technology bind. Downtime is inversely proportional to the availability
of spare parts and maintenance service. When the hospital administrator presents his case to the PRC he, in turn, binds its members. Rejection of the
proposal is tantamount to surgery by candlelight, administrative chaos, leaving
the sick and wounded in the halls waiting for diagnosis. Because of the technology bind, these proposals really represent entitlement programs for hospitals. Replacements for "obsolete" CAT scanners will undoubtedly be leveraged
in by the technology bind in the near future.
The "me-too principle" is based on the composition of the HSA region and
on the existence of certain leading hospitals which are usually out in front
of the crowd with respect to the latest technology and services. The Mid-State
HSA region is made up of eight counties. Each county has villages and towns
of varying sizes-some of which have their own hospitals. The "center" of the
region, in terms of population and health-care institutions, is a city of a
little over 300,000 population. A proposal for new construction or new equipment by a hospital in the central city can be (and often is) justified because
the leading hospital-a teaching hospital-has it. Since the leading hospital
does not serve the entire community, other hospitals, and their patients, have
a right to the same level of service. Hospitals in outlying counties and towns
use the central-city facilities as the basis of their claims. Why should their
patients have to travel all the way to the city for a CAT scan? The structure
of an HSA region, made up as it is of independent and competitive institutions
and political jurisdictions, makes the me-too principle an ever-present factor.
When we consider also that one of the objectives of the HSA legislation is to
improve "access" tohealth care, we can see that it is not an easy problem to
deal with.
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"Medical revivalism" is often combined with the "me-too principle." It
is seen in the testimony of physicians brought to the PRC meeting to describe
the new equipment or service desired, and to tell how it will save lives or
reduce inconvenience. Every physician called to testify can recall a number
of cases appropriate for the occasion. "But even if it only saves one life..."
is the clincher. The sin of failing to save one life is pounded home-in professional language, but with the fires of damnation dancing on the ceiling.
Would-be sinners on the PRC come forward and are saved-i.e., vote for the
proposal.
The "levitation factor" refers partly to the props that are part of the
act that hospital administrators present in defense of their proposals, and
partly to the world of appearances that they create. Any act needs props.
Here, they include color slides, architect's drawings, handouts, testimonial
letters, flip charts, etc. It is usually a class act. No one can fail to be
impressed by the amount of thought and effort that go into the presentation,
by the sincerity of the proponent, by the progress that will surely follow
from the plans. Committee members are treated respectfully, somewhat like
military commanders. "Yes, sir" is heard quite often in response to questions.
No one wants to stand in the way of progress-or in the way of sincere, hardworking, important but respectful men. The stage is thus set for the act's
finale. Not only is the proposal desirable-but it will cost nothing or at
most a trivial amount will be added to the cost per patient-day. The metaphysics of accounting create this illusion. Funded depreciation, for example,the free lunch of hospital accounting-will be used to pay for the equipment
desired. Since few on the committee understand funded depreciation and there
is no follow-up mechanism to analyze the real cost impact, the act ends impressively. The magical effect is appreciated more fully when the consumer
realizes that health-care costs continue to rise but nothing adds to the costs.
This impressionistic account of life on the PRC is meant to suggest that
certain forces operate on consumer members in such a way as to make simple,
rational decisions difficult. However, the expertise and the recruitment power
of the staff have the potential of redressing this imbalance of forces-either
by training consumer members, or by recruiting more militant consumers and at
least occasionally siding with them, drawing on their own expertise. The staff
seemed to give these functions a low priority. This can be seen in the recruitment of consumers.
Criteria for Consumer Recruitment
Consumers do not simply flow to the agency. They are recruited. And the
kinds of consumers recruited are important to all concerned, including the
HSA's professional staff. The evidence suggests that key staff members play
an important role in the recruitment of consumers, and that they have fairly
well-defined criteria of acceptable consumers. These favored consumers have
characteristics that lend themselves to the achievement of certain staff ofjectives.
Primary responsibility for consumer recruitment in the Mid-state HSA was
assigned to the Assistant Director for Community Involvement. According to

this official, 40 percent of the consumer members are directly recruited by
the staff. Others come in as a result of the work of the Speakers Bureau,
brochures left in physicians' waiting rooms, and other publicity activities.
It will be helpful at this point to identify some of the important factors
comprising the agency's situation so that they can be related to the criteria
for consumer recruitment. These factors are:
1. There is a time limit (90 days) for acting on applications;
2. Providers bring the greatest prestige and influence to the
decision-making process;
3. The legitimacy of the HSA's decisions in the community cannot
be taken for granted; and
4. Local interests are strong and are always a potential threat
to the attainment of regional plans.
In this situation, the staff has certain practical interests. These are identified in Table 1. The table also relates the four situational factors (above)
and consumer characteristics to the staff interests. The consumer characteristics were obtained from interviews with staff members and from analysis of
the occupations and incomes of consumers.
Table 1:

AGENCY SITUATION FACTORS, STAFF INTERESTS,
AND CONSUMER CHARACTERISTICS DESIRED

Agency Situation
1. Time limit on processing
applications
2. Provider prestige
and influence

3. Questionable legitimacy
of decisions

4. Localism

Staff Interest
Transacting business
with dispatch
(a) Obtain hearing for
staff recommendations
(b) Avoidance of "adversarial position" or
overt conflict with
providers

Characteristic
Desired in Consumer
"Interest"
(a) "Objectivity"

(b) Ideology of
common goals:
all "working
towards the
same thing"
(c) Favorable consumer
c) Ability to "say
decisions
no" to providers
(a) Securing formidable
(a) Professional or
allies and supporters
managerial status and/or
representing a
"constituency"
(b) Firm commitment of
(b) "Pro-HSA attoallies; acceptance of
tude"
professional planning
Collectivism; developing "Regional View"
acceptable regional plans

Information about the desired consumer characteristics was obtained from
interviews with the Assistant Director of Community Involvement, the official
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who is primarily responsible for consumer recruitment, and with the Assistant
Director for Project Review. The most important characteristics identified in
the interviews were (1) interest, (2) recognition of common goals, (3) representativeness, (4) a "regional view," and (5) an ability "to say no to providers"
on occasion.
Interest ranked high on the list of the Community Involvement official's
priorities-higher than "filling the categories" such as age, sex, and ethnic
group requirements. "You can always find somebody to fill the categories," he
stated.
Interest, however, signified that the person would be more likely to
attend meetings so that necessary decisions would not be postponed or delayed
for a lack of a quorum. We might note that schedules were made in advance for
the various levels of the organization-SAC, HSA Committee and Governing Bodyand deferred decisions caused problems up the line. Also, the 90-day time limit
for acting on applications presented to the Project Review Committee was a legal
requirement. Finally, it appeared that "interest" (and attendance) is necessary
to balance the more regular attendance of providers at meetings.
The ideology of the consumer was said to be not a factor in recruitment.
"We don't care what their views are, although it would be preferable if you had
somebody who was pro-HSA." Despite this disavowal of ideological criteria, however, there was an unofficial ideology of "centralism," a recognition of common
goals:
"I think in the beginning there was a feeling that there had
to be two different points of view-a provider point of view
and a consumer point of view. But I think somehow the two
have to work together and if there are two opposing points
of view, somehow they're going to have to come towards the
middle. If it's this sort of thing-us against them-its not
going to work, because they're always going to be fighting
each other. There's going to have to be some give and take
on both sides. But the bottom line is going to have to be
there's one point of view, more or less, a central point of
view-i.e., a commitment to improve the health-care system."
The desirability of having consumers represent a known constituency was
also mentioned. Although an "adversarial position" vis a vis providers is to
be avoided, consumers should nevertheless represent a constituency of some
kind, perhaps because this would increase the legitimacy of the HSA's actions.
The one complaint that the Assistant Director for Project Review had with regard to the consumers participating in the HSA was that they usually "represent
only themselves" and have "no constituency."
Farris' (1980) survey of the PRC consumers showed that they do not see
themselves as representing an organized constituency of any kind. The consumers
were asked what group or constituency they represented or considered themselves
to represent. The constituencies identified were broad categories such as general public, consumers, low-income people, and minority groups. Ultimately, this
problem reflected one of the many dilemmas found in the agency: if every consumer represented an organized or self-conscious constituency of some kind, the
control of staff over the process and its own professional vision of health

planning could be compromised. The relative absence of constituencies, however,
left the staff groping for community sentiments and left the legitimacy of decisions open to question.
When asked what were the significant decisions made by the Project Review
Committee (PRC) since she had been assigned responsibility for the committee,
the Assistant Director replied: "The x county's application for a scanner.
That was the first time the committee said no to a provider." The ability
(and willingness) to say "no" on occasion to-provider applications appeared to
be an important characteristic desired in consumers. The rejection of applications should not be carried to the extreme, however; rejecting too many applications would falsify the ideology of common cause with providers. "In the
end," she said, "we are all working towards the same thing," and an "adversarial
position" with respect to providers was not desirable.
Finally, desirable consumers should have a regional view rather than a
purely local view, able to transcend the strictly local interests of their own
communities. The Community Involvement Director asserted that "most younger
people (18-34) tend to get involved in things right in their own communities;
they don't normally get involved in regional-type activities-and we have to
go out and recruit them if we want them."
Control
The kinds of consumers actually recruited might make it appear that the
staff's control and its ability to achieve certain objectives would be weakened.
The consumers ranked high on interest, occupational prestige, income, and education. The PRC had eight consumer members (out of 15). One of these was a retired hospital administrator who, after one year in retirement, technically
became a consumer member. Of the remaining seven consumers, four were associated
with the professions of teaching and educational administration (one was the
wife of a college teacher), one was an engineer, one an attorney, and one was
a small business owner (about 20 workers). There were no ordinary workers on
the committee. Although income data is not highly reliable in this case (no
verification is required), four consumers had a family income in excess of
$25,000 per year; the other three reported $10-25,000 annually; none had family
incomes of less than $10,000.
These characteristics suggest a consumer majority that might easily go its
own way-oblivious of certain interests of the staff, such as the achievement
of harmonious relations between providers and consumers, the acceptance of the
HSA within the community, and the ability of the staff to have significant input into the process. Some of the findings already presented-e.g. the frequency with which the staff's recommendations were followed-suggest that the
PRC consumer majority does not act independently to any great degree. But to
understand why this was so, we need to look at some of the control mechanisms
that appeared to be operating.
If the consumers ranked relatively high on education, interest, etc., it
will also be recalled that they ranked low (or possessed little) "representativeness" and technological knowledge. Maintaining the isolation and ignorance
of the consumers were important objectives for the staff, objectives that were
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accomplished through the recruitment-promotion process, and through the encouragement of ambiguity and ad hoc decisions. By "isolation," it is meant
detachment from organized constituencies. There is, of course, no evidence
that these objectives and control mechanisms were consciously pursued and activated. They are inferred (quite tentatively) from what is known about the
situation the staff finds itself in, the characteristics of the consumer, and
observations of the decision-making process.
Ambiguity: The Health Systems Plan (HSP) developed by the Mid-State HSA
is required by the legislation. The plan was proposed by the agency's Plan
Development Committee, with the guidance of the staff, and accepted by the
Governing Body. Here, the HSP is of interest because it serves as the framework for much of the PRC's activity-expenditure proposals, for example, are
subjected to the test of whether they are consistent with the plan-and because
in the crucial area of cost containment, the plan is non-specific, having almost
nothing to say.
Of the 29 goals in the most recent plan, 15 are aimed at improved health,
nine are accessibility goals, two focus on the quality of health services and
three addressed to the problem of cost containment and duplication. "Improved
health" covers such things as immunization programs, health education in public
schools, reducing infant mortality rates, and family planning services.
"Accessibility" in this plan is addressed in the form of goals aimed at adding
hospital beds in certain outlying areas, lowering the physician-patient ratio
in some counties, and providing an "optimum level of long-term institutional
care" for residents of the region. The thorny problem of cost containment is
dealt with primarily by means of studies proposed-e.g., studying the feasibility of an HMO, and a study of "ways to utilize surplus or duplicative
facilities.
In the context of the HSA's overall commitment to cost-containment, this
reflects an ambiguity toward an important objective. The plan provides little
guidance to the PRC in this area. More important, some clearer definition of
cost-containment plans (including the development of standards) would free
consumers to pursue these. Ambiguity has the effect of tieing cost-containment
to specific proposals, and of strengthening dependence on the staff for analyses
and recommendations. This tendency was, of course, reinforced by the consumer's
generally low level of expertise and by the absence of a concerted training
program for consumers. Under these conditions, ad hoc decisions and dependence
are almost inevitable. Again, the reader is reminded that this is not necessarily (or even probably) pursued consciously by the staff. It is only argued
that consumer ignorance and dependence are consistent with the overall interests
of the staff and that this being so, it must be manifested in some way.
Isolation: The sub-area Advisory Councils (SACs) play an important role
in the recruitment and socialization of consumers. The Director of the agency
estimated that about 50% of the HSA's Governing Body and committees previously
served on one of the three SACs. The SACs then constitute a pool of potential
candidates for committee or Governing Body positions, with the usual path apparently leading first to a committee position, then possibly to a position on
the Governing Body of 30 members (plus one mandated representative from the
local VA hospital).
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The staff member assigned to the SACs is the Assistant Director for Community Involvement. He attends all meetings of the SACs and is the only staff
member with extensive knowledge of the consumers serving on the SACs, and his
recommendations on new committee members coming from one of the SACs carry considerable weight.
The interest of consumers serving on a SAC can be gauged by observation.
Those who pass the test can be recommended for committee or Governing Body
vacancies as they occur.
The Assistant Director noted that the SACs are "strictly advisory"; their
recommendations and decisions are not legally required in the planning and review activities of the agency. As such, they are an ideal mechanism for taking
in new consumers, sizing them up, sorting them out, and selectively promoting
them.
"Regionalism" is one ticket out of the SAC for those who are interested.
The SACs also play an important role in the socialization of consumers into a
"regional view" of health-care needs and in their selective promotion. The
Community Involvement Director explained:
"If you involve people on the subarea level, the chances
are they can relate to what goes on in the subarea a little
bit easier than what goes on at the regional level...Then
later on, once they understand what regional planning is
all about, if they're interested enough that they feel they
can make a contribution in a larger group-then they might
move up from the subarea to, say, the Project Review Committee."
Another ticket, we might infer, is "volunteerism"-meaning here the detachment from organized interest groups and constituencies. We must note two
things in this connection. The first is that while the regulations do not
require that consumers represent some organized constituency, neither do they
discourage or prevent it. We have seen that at least one official in the HSA
lamented the fact that the consumers represented no one but themselves. Second,
however, the Assistant Director in charge of recruiting did not mention the
constituency factor in the list of traits sought in consumers. This could have
been simply an oversight. But it seems more likely that it was consistent with
his and the agency's general emphasis on the development of common goals, consensus, and "civic mindedness." Conflict and adversarial relations were clearly
unwanted.
There is no way of saying whether "representatives" are even recruited at
the SAC level, and if so, whether those who fail to adopt the "common goals"
ideology are left in the SAC. The SACs themselves were not studied. We can
only say that if they were recruited at that level, they were not promoted
without the requisite socialization-as the voting patterns show-and that this
serves the overall objectives and views identified by the officials interviewed.
Staff Control and Environments
These practices may not be entirely local in nature. To some extent they
are built into the structure of HSAs. The HSA and its staff operate within
both a national environment and a local environment. The former includes certain
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national purposes and values; more concretely, these are expressed in the form
of P.L. 93-641 and other legislation, and more concretely still, the national
environment is represented by the Department of Health and Human Services (formerly DHEW). The national scene also includes the professional health-planning
community. Locally, the environment is characterized by political "conservatism" and provider prestige and power. Here, conservatism refers to a strong
belief in regionalism and local autonomy; it is anti-bureaucratic. Within the
region, of course, there is the familiar problem of rural vs. urban interests
and perspectives as well as the problem of local autonomy for the various
counties and municipalities involved. This is another way of saying that the
HSA region is an artificial community at the present time and that while autonomy for the region is strongly preferred over central control, consumer identification with their home towns and counties is a potential threat to a
regional spirit and the achievement of regional objectives if some sacrifice
is required in the allocation of health services. That is, in a world of real
communities, the staff has the difficult task of integrating an artificial one.
Operating within these environments, staff members at Mid-State HSA have three
major sets of goals: professional, material, and political.
Professional goals have to do with health planning for a community and all
that this entails: the use of professional techniques to identify problems, the
setting of objectives and priorities, and the mobilization of resources to
achieve the objectives. Planning is precisely what these health professionals
have been trained and hired to do. The central documents embodying the professional goals are the Health Systems Plan (HSP) and the Annual Implementation
Plan (ALP); all else is tested for "consistency with the plan." The essential
requirement for doing health planning is the availability of resources-in this
case, support staff, salaries, consumer and provider bodies, etc.
However, maintaining these resources-especially salaries-comprises the
material goals of staff. Job maintenance is an important objective at Mid-State
HSA just as it is in any organization. This objective is achieved primarily by
satisfying as many of the demands for accountability imposed by HHS as can be
satisfied without jeopardizing other important objectives. Some cost containment, for example, must be demonstrated. But aggressive cost-containment programs might require taking an adversarial position vis a vis providers, exposing
the health-planning efforts to dangerous attack and withdrawal of support from
this potent sector. Thus cost containment cannot be the major objective, although some results must be shown to satisfy the funding agency (and ultimately
the Congress). The more immediate goals appeared to be the acceptance of health
planning within the local environment and the legitimacy of the HSA's decisions.
These were apparently the political goals of the Mid-State staff. These goals
appeared to be extremely important to staff members-so much so that "militant"
consumers were seen as not helpful in the overall effort. Ultimately, the
political goals were attached to professional and material ones: one staff
member envisioned the day when local funds would take the place of federal
funds in health planning. In that case, local support would be indispensable
for the maintenance of jobs and professional activities.
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The point to be made is that the staff is at the intersection of several
"environments," each of which has its own demands. To serve each-and thus to
serve its own interests-required a balancing act by the staff. This balancing
act involved the subordination of consumer control -more specifically by means
of maintaining the isolation and ignorance of consumers.
Health care in general appears to be a tangle of shared interests and conflicting interests. Better health care, reduction of mortality rates, etc. can
be presumed to be among the interests of providers as well as consumers (though
perhaps for different reasons). The problem is that the provider version of
health care tends on the whole to prevail. Whatever conflicting interests there
are, and there are many involved in cost-containment, are swept aside.
There is, of course, an alternative explanation. People want better health
care and are willing to accept and pay for the provider definition of "better."
This cannot be clearly refuted here, although we can note that the consumers
surveyed do not tend to support such a statement with respect to costs. We can
only say that consumers in the Mid-State HSA were selectively recruited, socialized, and promoted in such a way as to minimize the possibility of purely consumer interests being on the agenda.
Making consumers representatives of organized constituencies would probably
be an improvement. But even this step would not deal with underlying structural
problems-independent political jurisdictions and hospitals, the market forces
involved in pushing technological advances, and others. Nor would this step
deal with the problem of staff as an interest group very well, barring any other
changes. Consumer representatives might well intensify the conflict, but without any other basis for remedies, that might be the extent of it.
In the absence of any fundamental changes in the organizations and control
of health care in the U.S., it may be that stabilizing the situation of the
staff would accomplish as much as anything else. The staff of the Mid-State
HSA was preoccupied with the legitimacy of the agency and its survival beyond
the immediate future. From this perspective, it appears that the American tendency to experiment with programs and then discard them when the short-term
results are disappointing almost guarantees program failures. Staff members
can hardly avoid becoming preoccupied with security issues, which necessarily
entails placating powerful groups. In the existing scheme of things the staff
is seen here as a key to the success of democratic control over health-care and
other institutions. Only the staff could offset the ignorance of the consumer
and see that consumer interests were placed on the agenda through its recruitment practice. That the staff did not do so is seen as more of a reflection of
its own precarious position than anything else.
Summa ry
The perspective adopted was that staff is one more group of professional
experts confronting the consumer directly, the others being the various categories of providers. Staff members have their own professional identity
(health planners), ideology, and objectives. Consumers are instrumental in the
achievement of these objectives and need to be carefully recruited, socialized,
and controlled.
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The recruitment of consumer members in the Mid-State HSA was largely in
the hands of the staff, who had formulated fairly clear criteria for the purpose. Consumers should be interested and pro-HSA; they should be able to say
no to providers on occasion, and represent some kind of constituency, yet recognize their common purpose with. providers; and they should have a regional
view of health care rather than a strictly local view. The consumers' level of
knowledge of the technical matters involved should be low, promoting dependence
on the staff. The kind of consumer recruited is of considerable importance to
the staff, and the consumer characteristics sought were related to certain
practical and professional interests of the staff (see Table 1).
On the surface, it would appear that at least some of the traits desired
in consumers were inconsistent with each other. For example, representing a
constituency would seem to be opposed to the goal of common purposes to be
pursued with provider "colleagues." There is some inconsistency; however, it was
argued that the staff is consistently attempting to manage and control the
diverse forces that impinge on the agency and its employees through the process
of consumer recruitment, and that the management of these forces is perceived
to require a careful and subtle balancing act.
The strategy of the staff, taking all things together, appeared to be one
of selective recruitment of consumers so as to reduce overt conflict and to
increase the acceptance and legitimacy of the agency. An important part of
the strategy was to secure provider acceptance of and cooperation with the HSA
mechanism, so that some planning and some cost containment could be achieved.
The informal criteria adopted for consumer recruitment had as their focus the
simultaneous pursuit of professional, material, and political goals within a
multi-dimensional environment. Only when we see consumer recruitment in this
or some similar way do the often conflicting requirements make sense.
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